

Local Election in Nepal: Means for Ensuring Electoral Accountability

Abstract

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The electoral accountability is considered a mechanism through which voters hold the government responsible for their performance. The main assumption in this article is that the more performance of local representatives as per their promise before elections under prevailing laws likely leads to more electoral accountability. To test this hypothesis, 455 questionnaires were collected from ordinary citizens and 28 interviews were taken with respective Gaupalika and Municipality's chief, deputy chief and executive from Sindhuli and Surkhet district of Nepal. The result showed that the performance of Surkhet districts' local governments have better significant relationship with electoral accountability index rather Sindhuli district. Despite of this relationship, people were neither satisfied not unsatisfied with the performance of local representative. There are a lot of hindering factors associated with the performance of local representatives which include lack of financial resource, lack of knowledge how to handle local government, lack of employees, lack of infrastructure etc. Therefore, the study concludes that the electoral accountability in Nepal is in transitional stage.

Key words: Election, electoral accountability, performances, local bodies, Nepal

Electoral accountability

The electoral accountability is considered one of the mechanism through which voters hold the government responsible for their performance (Fumarola, 2016). The notion of periodic election allows sanctioning political parties if they do wrong and reward if they perform as per citizens' mandate. Electoral accountability depends on two sets of conditions: voters' ability to assign responsibility for performance outcomes to incumbents and voters ability to act upon those assignment of responsibility(Hellwig and Samuels, 2008).The voter's ability to hold governments to account is greatly influenced by the contingent characteristics of the political context (Fumarola, 2016). Schedler (1999) defines the concept of accountability which is equal to *answerability* plus *enforcement*. Answerability is about the obligation of government to provide information and justification for the performances or series of performance carried out by political parties whereas enforcement stands for the sanction. Voters evaluate and judge the performance of political parties whether political parties act according to citizens mandate or not. It is said that power holders are free to act as they choose without any checks and balance in the absence of answerability. In the absence of enforcement, where there are no consequences for failing to provide a satisfactory account, so the process of demanding and providing an account is undermined.

In European democracies, voters' ability to express dissatisfaction with economic performance is affected by specific characteristics of political context (Fumarola, 2016). Government clarity of responsibility (Hobolt et al, 2013), existence of available alternatives(Anderson, 2000), the influence of electoral system (Powell, 2000), pluralistic mass media may contribute to the functioning mechanism of accountability, ensuring information about the political acts promoted by the incumbent and the possibility for voters to identify and potentially to sanction it(Fumarola, 2016, 56). In the absence of competitive environment for politics would be fatal (Besley, 2006, pp. 124-128) and other institutional environment would inhibit electoral accountability. Because conventional assumptions about electoral accountability hold that elections enable voters to sanction governments, it is important to recognize that the power of sanction might in theory lead to control, or to influence, or to something in between (Maloy, 2015). The wave of democracy is spread throughout world since 1990. However, there is questionable between democratic accountability and competitive election (Maloy, 2014).

Problems of voter judgment may have no solution at all, or no institutional solution, but theories of and experiments with deliberative assemblies are laudable efforts to investigate that question (Maloy, 2015).

Federalism and intergovernmental policy making may reduce voter's ability to hold their government (Cutler, 2004). Landa & Duell(2015) argue that social identities increases the weight of representatives' efforts in voters' reelection decisions. When economic conditions are bad, citizens vote against the ruling party (Lewis-Beck, Michael S., 1991). Majority/minority status of the government, party cohesion, opposition committee chairs and opposition control affects the electoral accountability. Hellwig and Samuels (2008) argue that regime type determines the ways and extent to which election enable voters reward or sanction incumbents. They reveal that voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Micozzo(2012) argues drawing experiences from Argentine Senate that electoral accountability makes difference in election system, career ambition and legislative performance.

The literature shows the relationship between government's performances and electoral accountability. In other word, electoral accountability depends upon the performance of the government which is mandated through periodical election. In this context, the research on electoral accountability and government performance in general and particularly local government context is rare in Nepalese changed context. Major political upheaval took place in Nepal since 1990. Political upheaval could lead to change. Since 1990, three local elections were held in 1992, 1997 and 2017. Local government remains vacuum for 20 years after second local election because of Maoist insurgency and people's movement-II (2006). The past experiences of local government reveals that local political leaders explain very good activities in their manifesto but they fail to act accordingly when they are in power. There is gap between prescriptions in their manifesto and observations in reality. As per new constitution formulated in 2015 through constituent assembly, the local government is formed through local election in 2017. In this background, it is interesting to explore to what extent local governments are accountable towards general public. Whether local government would able to deliver their performance according to their election manifesto or not? What kinds of reform strategies they

adopted for the sake of ensuring electoral accountability? Also what kind of barrier they faced to implement their manifesto?

In this research paper, the electoral accountability refers to the capability of elected government representatives to furnish the activities prescribed in their political manifestos as well as in laws proactively. It also refers to their sensitiveness towards needs and aspirations of citizens in general and specifically marginalized community, women, and children and marginalized groups of the community. The performance of the elected representatives refers to delivery of health, education, drinking water, communication, light services. It also includes drainage management, upgradation and construction of road, vital registration and certification and social allowances. Thus, my assumption is that the more performances of elected representative at local level of Nepal may likely lead to higher degree of electoral accountability. Nepalese voters hold the elected representatives.

Political manifestos of Nepalese political parties

UML made a commitment before Nepalese citizens through its manifesto before local election 2017. The main slogan given by UML is 'properous, equality and strong foundation for national development: local to central level's government of UML'. According to UML's commitment, each Nepali Citizen will have share in hydro-electricity. The connecvity will also diversified. There will be road, railways, cable cars, air route etc. Economic development will also based on tourism development. Agriculture sector will be moderninced. Airable farmland will have irrigation facilities. The more additional commitment as per UML manufestor includes 'one province on industrial areas'. Human resource development is also another areas of its commitment. Three international standards sports stadium having more than 50 thousand capacity will be constructed. Foreign policy will be based on balanced interational relations. Out of total revenue, 50 percent revenue will goes to local government. Integrated settlment programs will launched. Smart cities will formed. Each citizen will get free education. 20 percent revenue will be allocated in education sector. Health insurance facilities will be for all. Fifty percent premium will pay by government for those who are below poverty line. Local unit will have well equipped hospital having 25 beds in Gaupalika and 50 beds in municipality. The economic policy is guided by cooperative. As per its manifesto, cooperative in each Gaupalik and employment opportunity for each household [Gaugauma Sahakari: Ghargharma Rojgari].

Nepal will be upgraded from least developed country to medium level income through increasing per capita income more than 5000\$. 15 thousands MW additional electricity will be generated within 10 years.

Commitment of Nepali Congress in local election 2017 before citizens. NC has aimed to develop double digit economic growth. 95 percent literacy rate will be achieved by 10 years. Less than 3 percent people will be below poverty line. Ten thousand MW electricity will be produced by 10 years. There will be four international airport. 32 Lakhs tourist will be arrived in Nepal. NC will make 15 bed full equipped hospital in each local body. Each wards will be connected by black topped road. At least one bank will be intalled in each local body. Integrated service center will be formed.

CPN (Maoist Center) has 'formally' unveiled its election manifesto for the upcoming local polls, promising swift social and economic reforms. The 30-point commitment letter was made public. Though the party had already made its elections commitment public at the local level, it was the first time the manifesto was formally unveiled. In its commitment letter, the party has pledged to give more power to local bodies. The party has also expressed its commitment to introduce various schemes to help the poor families, unemployed youths, farmers and workers. The party has also promised to provide free internet services. It has also declared to work in reforming the land laws to ensure land to the landless people. Similarly, it has also promised to work on developmental activities.

Unlike the manifestos of its coalition partner Nepali Congress and the main opposition CPN-UML, the CPN (Maoist Center)'s manifesto look more balanced. Instead of making big promises, the party has highlighted its role in institutionalizing historical achievements like federalism. The party has chosen its official election slogan as “Maoist Center’s gift: Singha Durbar in village and municipalities”.

Local election provision in Nepal

753 local governments are in operation in Nepal excluding 77 district coordination committees. There are 293 municipalities and 460 rural municipalities in Nepal. In 2017, the local election was held in Nepal after long gap of 20 years. There were only three local elections held in Nepal since 1990(restoration of democracy). The first and second local election were held in 1992 and

1997 respectively. There was great variations between the first two local election and the last one. First two local election were held under unitary system of government and the last one in under federal system. The more power and authority is vested upon the local government than former local government.

As per constitution, there shall be a village or municipal executives elected on the basis of one person one vote in accordance with the first past the post election system. Chief of local body(chairperson and vice-chairperson in case of village municipality and mayor and deputy mayor in case of municipality), ward chairperson, women member, dalit women member and member are elected through election. The tenure of each elected member would be five years. As per this constitution, political parties should nominate different sex in case of chief and deputy chief of local body while contesting election. This provision makes sure representation of both men and women in the top two post. Two women members including dalit and minority women and two members are elected through direct election. One voter should cast his/her vote seven members. 35041 members both executive and legistive members of local government will be elected. There were 14,054,482(as of February 20, 2017) voters in Nepal: 7,069,714 men, 6,984,625 women and 143 third gender. These voters were increased by 16.2 percent from the last national constituent election 2013.

Table 1 Data of local election

Local government's position political parties-wise 2017						
Positions	UML	NC	Maoist Center	Others	Total	N
Mayors	42	36	11	11	100	293
DyMayors	47	29	15	9	100	293
Chairperson	37	35	16	12	100	460
Vice-chairperson	42	30	15	13	100	460
Ward Chairperson	39	33	16	12	100	6742
Women Members	41	32	15	12	100	6742
Dalit Women Members	41	32	16	11	100	6567
Members	41	33	15	11	100	13484
Total	40	33	16	11	100	35041

Source: Election Commission Nepal, 2017

In 2017, local election was held in three phases viz. first phase(Province 3,4 & 6), second phase(1,5 and 7 provinces) and third phase(Province 2). The result of election shows that 42

percent of mayors and 47 percent deputy mayors were won by Communist Party of Nepal, United Marxist Leninist(UML). Likewise, Nepali Congress(NC) won 36 percent mayors and 29 percent deputy mayors and stood second largest party. The third largest party become Nepal Communist Party Maoist(Center) through wining 11 percent mayor and 15 percent deputy mayors.

UML bagged 37 percent chairpersons and 42 percent vice-chairperson of rural municipality. Likewise, NC won 35 percent chairperson and 30 person vice chairperson in local election as a second largest party of local election. Similarly, the third largest party in village municipality is also Maoist –Center through wining 16 & 15 percent seats of Chairpersons and Vice-chairperson respectively. Likewise, 39 percent ward chairperson’s seats are won by UML, 33 percent by NC, 16 percent by Maoist-center and 12 percent by others. In case of women member and Dalit women, UML won 41 percent seats for each, 32 percent for each by NC, 15 percent for each by Maoist center and rest of 12 percent by other. The same kinds of trends is repeated in case of members. In totality, 40 percent of seats were bagged by UML, 33 percent seats by NC, 16 percent seats by Maoist-center and 11 percent by others. Out of 11 percent seats, 4 percent seats won by Sanghiya Samajbadi Forum Nepal, 3 percent seats by Rastriya Janata Party Nepal and rest of 4 percent by Nepal Loktantric Forum, Ratriya Prjatantra Party and other fringe political party. In particular, Sanghiya Samajbadhi Forum Nepal and Rastriya Janata Party Nepal won majority seats in Province No 2. These party were closely nill in other provinces.

Duties and responsibilities of local government in Nepal

Local government is formed as per constitution 2015 (Part 17 & 18). Right now, there are 753 local governments and 77 district coordination committees. Schedule 8 of the constitution has prescribed the functions that should be carried out by local bodies. There are 22 lists of functions which include police service, cooperatives, operation of FM, taxations and management of the local services. Similarly, records keeping and its analysis, basic health services, education services, local market, welfare activities, water supply, disaster management etc are other functions which should be performed by local government. Likewise, schedule 9 of the constitution also prescribes 15 types of concurrent power of federation, State and local government. On the basis of this constitutional provision, Local Government Operation Act 2017 made details of these kinds of functions. Municipal police service with the objective to enforce

the laws can be constituted, operated, managed and set standards by local government. Cooperative is recognized as one of economic backbone. Local government can set policies and standards of cooperatives to mobilize local resource. Local government has power to grant permission for operating upto 100 W local FM. Local government can levy the tax without making any contradiction with federal and provincial laws. These categories of taxation include property tax, house rent tax, land registration tax, vehicle tax, service charge, tourism fees, entertainment tax etc. Local government also formulates policies related to its human resource management. Record keeping and its analysis, designing master plan for physical development, its implementation and its monitoring and evaluation; delivering health, education, etc are other vital function of local government. Likewise, disaster management, welfare of its citizens, management of natural resources, reduction of poverty, vital registration etc are other functions of local government.

Likewise, Inter-government Financial Management 2017 also categorizes the tax system separately for all central government, provincial government and local government. As per this act, local government can levied direct tax which include property tax, house rent tax, house land registration tax, vehicle tax, land tax, entertainment tax, advertisement tax and business tax. Similarly, local government can also levy indirect tax such as service fee, tourist fee and punishment fee. Local government can get 25 percent of total revenue raised from natural resource. The natural resource here refers to mountaineering, electricity, forest, mining and water and other resource.

Power, functions and responsibilities of executives: Chief of village municipal or municipality shall call for meeting under his/her chairmanship to set plans, policies and programs. He/she shall put forward agendas in the meeting. The chief executive shall allow preparing budget and presenting in the meeting. The chief of local government will depute deputy chief and executive officer. He/she need to handle grievances of local people. Similarly, deputy chief of local government has to act as a coordinator of judicial committee. He/she coordinates and supervises the function of local NGOs and 'consumer interest protection group'. He/she presents the monitoring and evaluation report of projects and program in the meeting. Likewise, Ward chair is a prime position in the local government. The ward chair has to set plan, policies and program at his/her ward. He/she should supervise, monitor and evaluate the programs which have

launched within his/her ward. He/she is at the bottom where everything has to implement. Sole burden goes to Ward chairs and they are supported by ward members.

Research Methodology

This study was conducted in Sindhuli and Surkhet two districts out of 75 districts of Nepal. Both districts had a unique feature. Both the districts touched both Terai and hilly ecological regions of Nepal. Sindhuli represented from eastern part of Nepal had slightly less populous than Surkhet which was from Western part of Nepal. Both the districts were different in terms of gender population, demographic compositions, literacy rate and others. Regarding to local governments, Sindhuli has 9 local units (7 Gaupalika and 2 municipalities) whereas Surkhet has 10 local units(4 Gaupalika and 6 municipalities). For the detail comparison, see annex 1. Among 19 local units, 14 local units, 6 from Sindhuli and 8 from Surkhet were chosen through lottery system. There were five municipalities and 9 Gaupalika. Regarding to respondents selections, those respondents who visited local units seeking services from local government during February 4-6, 2018 in Sindhuli and January 15-17, in Surkhet were selected through employing systematic sampling technique. The questionnaire survey was continuing till the respondents reached upto 30 at least. There were 455 altogether, 213 from Sindhuli and 242 from Surkhet collected. See annex 2 details for respondents and corresponding local government of both districts. Thus collected respondents' features were presented in annex 3. These respondents were categorized on the basis of their general identity, sex, religious, occupation and monthly income. In addition to this, 28 interviews with Chairpersons, Vice-chairpersons and Executive Officers of Gaupalika(two from three) and Mayor, Deputy Mayors and Executive officers of Municipalities(here too, two from three) were interviewed through open ended questionnaire. To determine the level electoral accountability, simple percentage tool was used. To find out relationship between performance of local government with electoral accountability, Pearson correlation technique was employed. The result was also validated through the interview with the authorities of local governments.

Findings

Electoral accountability

To find out the level of electoral accountability at local level in Nepal, questions such as capability of local leader to furnish the job as promised during election and prescribed laws; their proactiveness towards citizens' need and aspiration, fairness for treatment, satisfaction of local people, setting priority of the function etc were asked to the respondents. The main intention was to measure the level of electoral accountability.

Table 2. Electoral Accountability in Nepal

Variables	Sindhuli			Surkhet		
	Agree	Disagree	N	Agree	Disagree	N
I found local body's elected leaders are capable person to run local body.	69	31	207	30	70	227
I found their behavior is proactive towards ordinary citizens.	68	32	209	54	46	230
They treat citizens equally, impartially and fairly.	67	33	208	59	41	228
Employees of local bodies are sensitive towards citizens' needs and aspirations.	67	33	204	60	40	222
I found local leaders and employees are working as per rules and regulations of local body.	69	31	200	56	44	214
I am satisfied with local leaders and employees working style.	67	33	205	58	42	226
I found local leaders and employees give priority to women.	74	26	204	62	38	227
I found local leaders and employees give priority to elderly people.	79	21	211	62	38	223
I found local leaders and employees give priority to socially marginalized community.	67	33	201	43	57	224
I found local leaders and employees are working as per choices of local people.	65	35	202	58	42	221
I found citizens are holding local leaders and employees.	63	37	208	57	43	217
I found they advise the process of work to be done precisely.	62	38	208	62	38	213

Source: Field Study, 2018

About two third respondents of Sindhuli opined that local leaders are capable to run local level. However, the respondents of Surkhet doubt their capability. Relatively, leaders' proactiveness towards ordinary citizen relatively better in Sindhuli district rather Surkhet district. The same

kind of observation was found in their fair, impartial and equal treatment. The follow up of rules and regulations was found a bit of doubt in both cases. Two third of respondents in Sindhuli opined the leaders follows the rules and regulation whereas only 56 percents leaders in Surkhet district. The satisfaction of people was also neither bad nor good in both cases. Priority for women, children, elderly people and marginalized community was also relatively better situation in Sindhuli district than Surkhet district. More than fifth percent respondents opined that people were able to hold locally elected representatives. In totality, the level of electoral accountability relatively better situation in Sindhuli district rather Surkhet district.

Local government's performance and electoral accountability index

The questions which were prescribed in political manifesto of UML, NC and Maoist Center as well as Local Government Operation Act, 2017 were asked to our respondents. As per their commitment, basic services such as health, education, toilet, drinking water, road, peace and security, vital registration, communication and light will make available to the people and access to all citizens. While testing their relationship with electoral accountability, some of the services which have significant relationship with the performance of local government are found. This was tested by Pearson Coefficient correlation methods. The health service delivery which was measured in terms of their accessibility, immunization, delivery by skill births attendants, had significant relationship with electoral accountability in Surkhet. However, some of the performances of these indicators were not have significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Sindhuli district.

In the same line, delivery of education was also same nature in both districts. Surkhet district has better situation than in Sindhuli district. However, the issue of drop rate in school education was not addressed by elected representatives in both districts. The data showed the relationship between drop rate and electoral accountability index had insignificant relationship. The availability of trained teachers and accessibility of disadvantaged groups both had significant relationship with the electoral accountability index in both districts.

In both district, toilets, drinking water, houses of local inhabitant, cooking stove, house foundations etc had insignificant relationship with electoral accountability index. These services

which were promised by elected representatives were not delivered by them at the significant level.

Table 3 Local government performance and electoral accountability

	Sindhuli			Surkhet		
	Pearson coefficient	Sig	N	Pearson coefficient	Sig	N
Health institutions are easily accessible.	-0.038	0.633	164	.198**	0.016	147
Children below five years in local body	0.052	0.519	157	.222***	0.008	142
Accessible for immunization	0.131*	0.094	163	.234***	0.005	145
Pregnancy check up	0.102	0.209	154	0.152*	0.07	144
Delivery by skilled birth attendants	.160**	0.048	152	0.106	0.205	144
Schools are easily accessible.	-0.07	0.377	163	.207**	0.013	145
Admission rate at the schools	0	0.998	159	.207**	0.012	146
Not admitted students.	0	0.997	161	.235***	0.004	147
Drop rate at schools	0.012	0.885	159	0.062	0.464	144
Availability of appropriate class room	.183**	0.02	160	0.103	0.22	144
Availability of trained teachers	.252***	0.001	159	.163**	0.049	147
Accessibility to DAG at school	.231***	0.004	156	.230***	0.005	149
Toilet	-0.022	0.776	165	0.08	0.337	148
Drinking water	0.021	0.792	165	0.037	0.658	146
Houses of local inhabitant	-0.057	0.47	165	0.096	0.244	149
Cooking stove/fuel	-0.095	0.225	164	0.02	0.81	148
House foundation	-0.096	0.223	162	0.15	0.068	149
Communication	-0.039	0.618	163	.185**	0.023	151
Light	-0.021	0.793	162	.201**	0.014	148
Drainage system at your localities	-0.006	0.941	153	.233***	0.005	147
Status of road	0.075	0.355	156	.240***	0.003	150
Peace and security	0.154*	0.053	159	.253***	0.002	150
Vital registrations	0.114	0.148	162	.205**	0.013	148
Certification of relation	0.089	0.263	160	.267***	0.001	149
Approval of map of the house	.178**	0.032	146	0.124	0.128	151
Other certification	.252***	0.001	159	.187**	0.023	148
Social security	0.132*	0.096	161	.191**	0.019	151
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).						
*. Correlation is significant at the .10 level(2-tailed)						

Source: Field study, 2018

Communication, light, drainage system, status of road, vital registrations, certification of relationship etc had significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Surkhet but not in Sindhuli District. On the contrary to this, approval of map of the houses was having significant

relationship with electoral accountability in Sindhuli district but not in Surkhet district. Peace and security maintenance, other certification and distribution of social security allowances had significant relationship with electoral accountability index.

The result from ordinary citizens' remarks showed that some of the performances were in better situation in Surkhet district rather in Sindhuli district. Responsible reasons which were collected from interviews include lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge, lack of human resource as well as the lack of rules and regulations hindered for better performance of the local representatives.

The local government of Nepal was formed in 2017. These were led by elected representative after 20 years of long intervals. They had not formed financial base for the running local government, were dependent on central grants. The local representatives also did not have technical ideas to lead local government. The supportive staffs were also found not sufficient as per requirement. Those who were in job were not capable to translate policy into realities through plans, policy, program and projects. Because of newly established local government, there were required hundreds of rules and regulations, were not formulated. Some of performances were also hampered due to lack of rules and regulation. Another important reason which was outlined by employee, local representatives were also not much interested in the areas where they did not get benefits personally. Another executive officer outlined the reasons that hampered performance of local government to ensure electoral accountability included more expectation of people, lack of financial resources, lack skilled human resources, insufficient infrastructure, lack of coordination between and among employees and local representatives.

Conclusion

Electoral accountability is vital indicator whether democracy is functioning as per citizens' need and aspirations. Citizens need to hold elected representatives otherwise they act what they like. Elected representatives should give answer whether they act according to their commitment made before election and existing rules and regulations. They should be able to sanction their promise and commitment when they come in power. Nepal formed local government through constituent assembly. There are 753 local governments. In 2017, local election was held after 20 years long gap. From the elections, about 40 percent seats of local government won by UML, 33

percent by NC, 16 percent by Maoist Center and rest 11 percent by other. As a largest party in local election, major share of electoral accountability goes to UML. Translation of UML's manifesto under prevailing laws is prime indicator of electoral accountability. From field study, it showed that elected representatives in Sindhuli district are accountable than Surkhet districts' representatives. However, both the districts' representatives are neither best nor bad. While testing, the relationship between performance and electoral accountability index, Surkhet district have relatively better situation than Sindhuli district. Almost all performance except toilet, drinking water, building house etc have significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Surkhet district. Outlined reasons not having desired electoral accountability at local level as identified from interview include lack of required laws, lack of human resource, lack of infrastructure, newly formed local government, and lack of coordination between and among employees and representatives etc. There is also hidden factor not being serious about their performance at local level include deceived attitude of local representative. They have invested a lot of money in election. They wanted to collect it during the tenure. Such factors have been hampering electoral accountability at local level in Nepal. Therefore, it can be concluded that the local electoral accountability in Nepal is in transitional state. Local representatives, employees and people are learning electoral accountability at local level in Nepal.

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Annex 1. Comparison of Sindhuli and Surkhet District

Variables	Sindhuli District	Surkhet District
a. Population(number)	296192	350804
Male(number)	142123	169421
Female(Number)	154069	181383
b. Caste and ethnicity		
Ethnic groups (in percent)	64	24
Dalits (in percent)	12	25
Brahman/Chhetri (in percent)	23	50
Madhesi (in percent)	1	1
Others	>1	>1
c. Literate (in number)	165389	233794
Male (in number)	90721	125511
Female (in number)	74668	108283
d. Literacy rate (in percent)	60.53	73.12
d. Area (Sq. km)	2491	2451
e. Population density(Per sq. km)	119	143
h. Households (in number)	57544	72830
i. Rural municipality	7	4
j. Municipality	2	6

Source: CBS, 2014

Annex 2. Respondents from each local body

Name of rural municipalities and municipalities	Name of district		Total
	Sindhuli	Surkhet	
Barahtal Rural Municipality	0	30	30
Bheriganga Municipality	0	32	32
Birendranagar Municipality	0	30	30
Chingad Rural Municipality	0	29	29
Golanjor Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Gurbhakot Municipality	0	30	30
Kamalamai Municipality	63	0	63
Lekbeshi Municipality	0	30	30
Marin Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Panchpuri Municipality	0	32	32
Phikal Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Simta Rural Municipality	0	29	29
Sunkoshi Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Tinpatan Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Total	213	242	455

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Annex 3. Characteristics of respondents

		Sindhuli	Surkhet
Types of respondents	Ordinary citizen	60	46
	Political cadre	7	9
	Local level employee	16	16
	Ethnic group	7	14
	Marginalized groups and Dalits	3	4
	Social workers or mobilizer	6	6
	Others	0	6
Gender	Male	58	50
	Female	42	50
Religion	Hindu	95	81
	Muslim	0	8
	Christian	1	7
	Buddhist	4	4
Literacy	Illiterate	8	4
	Literate	92	96
Occupation	Working	38	18
	Self-employed	22	25
	Unemployed	20	15
	Retired	2	2
	Student	8	30
	House wife/home maker	10	10
Monthly income	Upto Rs 10,000	42	32
	Rs 10001-20000	24	35
	Rs. 20001-30000	28	29
	Rs 30001-40000	4	3
	Rs 40001-50000	1	1
	Rs 50001 above	1	1
	Total	100/213	100/242

Source: Field Study, 2018