What have the long post-2008 crisis and Brexit meant for Eurosceptic attitudes and Eurosceptic parties? While the crisis can be seen as reinforcing partisan and public opposition to European integration, does Brexit exacerbate or reduce this? The answer to this is not necessarily straightforward. For example, although populist parties tend to be the most anti-EU forces in their respective countries, their positions on European integration are neither uniform, static or equally salient. Some of these parties have embraced rejectionist positions while others advocate reform. Similarly, we know that public attitudes critical of the European Union do not necessarily translate into a desire to leave. Euroscepticism, in short, is not unidirectional. We are thus faced with questions not only about the trajectory of contemporary Euroscepticism among publics and parties, but also how Eurosceptic parties reconcile positional differences both between one another and between them and their potential electorates.
In order to understand these dynamics, this panel includes comparative studies of the positions on European integration taken by Eurosceptic parties, along with papers looking at how both the post-2008 crisis and Brexit have impacted on public and partisan attitudes towards the EU.